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We analyze the earnings information and stock prices of S&P500 firms and find that investors fol-
lowing S&P500 stocks (i) respond more to pro forma earnings than to GAAP earnings, (ii) respond to 
an emphasis on pro forma earnings, and (iii) are fixated on pro forma earnings. We provide the first 
direct evidence that a strategic emphasis on earnings numbers may affect return volatility. Further, 
our results do not support the argument that a larger investor response to Street earnings might be 
driven by large differences between the Street numbers and GAAP numbers.
1. Introduction
This study examines whether a strategic emphasis on 
earnings numbers in company press releases has any 
impact on stock returns. We define strategic empha-
sis as emphasis on one earnings number over another 
or the exclusion of an earnings number from a press 
release with the purpose of painting a rosy picture of 
a firm’s financial position. Given that a vast amount of 
information is constantly flowing into the market, it is 
very difficult for even astute investors to sift through 
such an information flow in an organized manner. 
Indeed, departing from the traditional analytical 
modeling of financial reporting that assumes inves-
tor rationality and market efficiency with respect to 
public information, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) show 
that, due to limited investor attention and informa-
tion processing capacity, informationally equivalent 
disclosures can have very different effects on investor 
perceptions, depending on the form of presentation. 
Other theoretical studies, such as that of Bloomfield 
(2002), also suggest that companies can influence 
investors’ judgment by putting earning numbers 
in a  prominent place (headline or lead paragraph) 
in a press release or by burying them somewhere in 
a less prominent position. Therefore, it is important to 
examine whether there is any informational value in 
emphasizing a preferred earnings metric in companies’ 
press releases. Obviously, investors form expectations, 
at least partially, about the stocks they follow on the 
basis of what they read in the earnings press releases. 
Companies’ earnings press releases usually include 
two types of earnings numbers: GAAP (Generally Ac-
cepted Accounting Principles) earnings and pro forma 
earnings (popularly known as Street earnings). For 
GAAP earnings, specific rules are followed to calculate 
earnings, whereas pro forma earnings are often de-
fined by companies and calculated without following 
any standard rules. However, the purposeful exclusion 
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of certain items from pro forma earnings (e.g., nonre-
curring transitory items) is possible in earnings press 
releases because they are not subject to the SEC’s (Se-
curities and Exchange Commission) scrutiny unless 
they are fraudulent. 
Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) provide compelling evi-
dence of managers’ tendency to emphasize Street earn-
ings because they present the Street earnings earlier 
than the GAAP earnings in press releases. The authors 
relate the tendency of managers to report higher Street 
numbers to a ﬁrm’s effort to achieve higher valuations. 
Subsequently, studies have identified at least four spe-
cific reasons why firms emphasize pro forma earnings 
over GAAP earnings in their reports. First, firms delib-
erately report pro forma earnings when their earnings 
and stock prices start to decline (Bhattacharya, et al., 
2004). Second, firms with greater incidences of losses, 
higher leverage, and higher proportions of special 
items tend to report pro forma earnings (Lougee and 
Marquardt, 2004). Third, firms may manipulate earn-
ings to meet or beat analysts’ expectations (Doyle, Mc-
Nichols, & Soliman, 2013). Finally, senior executives 
may try to use discretionary components of earnings 
to inflate a firm’s reported earnings and thus its stock 
price because their compensation packages are tied to 
the company stock price (Bergstresser & Phillippon, 
2006). Empirical evidence also shows that stock re-
turns around earnings announcement days are more 
responsive to pro forma earnings than to GAAP earn-
ings (Bhattacharya, et al., 2003; Brown & Sivakumar, 
2003). Bowen, Davis and Matsumoto (2005) find that 
a strategic emphasis on an earnings metric (pro forma 
or GAAP) affects stock market participants, and firms 
with more media exposure place a greater emphasis on 
pro forma earnings than on GAAP earnings. 
Relatedly, from a  behavioral accounting perspec-
tive, the functional fixation hypothesis of Hand (1990) 
suggests that individual investors do not consider 
the quality of earnings. Experimental research on fi-
nancial information processing also suggests that the 
market mechanically capitalizes reported earnings 
numbers without adjusting for the quality of the earn-
ings (Libby, Bloomfield, & Nelson, 2002). According 
to Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), limited attention pro-
vides a motivation for such functional fixation on the 
part of the investors. If the functional fixation holds, 
a pro forma disclosure may cause investors to perceive 
an earnings announcement as more favorable, which, 
in turn, causes them to expect a higher stock price in 
the period around such an announcement.
When companies tend to purposefully emphasize 
pro forma earnings and investors care only about the 
earnings numbers without paying much attention to 
the underlying accounting procedures and/or have 
limited information processing capacity, then a thor-
ough analysis of the emphasis on a particular earn-
ings metric becomes an issue of obvious importance 
to investors and market regulators. In our effort to as-
sess the informational value of a strategic emphasis on 
earnings numbers, we analyze the earnings informa-
tion and stock prices of S&P500 firms and address the 
following three research questions in this paper:
a  Does a deliberate emphasis on a particular earnings 
number in company press releases attract a share-
holder’s attention and affect stock prices? As long 
as ﬁrms use a strategic emphasis and investors per-
ceive pro forma earnings as more value relevant, we 
should ﬁnd a positive relationship between returns 
and such an emphasis unless investors identify that 
such an emphasis is completely opportunistic. Ac-
cordingly, we conjecture that return responses to 
a pro forma earnings emphasis will be greater than 
the return responses to a GAAP emphasis.
b  Does a  managerial emphasis in earnings disclo-
sures affect the volatility of stock returns? Ideally, 
the very purpose of earnings disclosures in compa-
ny press releases in general is to accelerate the reso-
lution of investor uncertainty. Accordingly, in the 
wake of a current period’s earnings press release, 
we would normally expect to observe a decline in 
uncertainty as measured by the volatility of stock 
returns. However, an alternative possibility is that 
an opportunistic emphasis on earnings numbers 
may magnify the information asymmetry among 
market participants associated with an earnings 
surprise and thereby increase the volatility of re-
turns, at least in the short run (see, for example, 
Kim & Verrecchia, 1994). It is also not unlikely that 
investors’ uncertainty about intrinsic firm value in-
creases because of a deliberate emphasis placed on 
a particular earnings number.
c  Are investors really fixated on pro forma earnings? 
The functional fixation hypothesis (Hand, 1990) 
posits that investors are ﬁxated on an earnings Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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metric, and they do not adjust for earnings quality. 
On the contrary, however, Abarbanell and Lehavy 
(2007) show that studies using Street earnings sup-
plied by the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System 
(IBES) as a proxy for pro forma earnings and Com-
pustat-provided GAAP earnings may erroneously 
support the idea that investors are more responsive 
to Street earnings. The authors claim that the find-
ings supporting the fixation hypothesis may reflect 
frequently observed large differences between 
Street and GAAP earnings. We verify whether the 
claim against the functional fixation hypothesis is 
confirmed by our data.
Although our study is similar in some respects to that 
of Bowen at al. (2005), our study can be considered an 
expanded analysis of a strategic emphasis on earnings 
metrics in the following contexts. First, our study ex-
amines the impact of an emphasis on earnings numbers 
on volatility in addition to stock returns. Prior empiri-
cal studies have examined only stock return response to 
a strategic earnings emphasis. Stock return volatility is 
an important risk factor to consider in investors’ port-
folio management decisions. Higher volatility implies 
a wider distribution of possible final portfolio values 
and lower terminal wealth. Second, this study provides 
empirical evidence that the functional fixation hypothe-
sis propounded by Hand (1990) holds even after we rec-
ognize the claim made by Abarbanell and Lehay (2007). 
Additionally, this paper provides compelling evidence 
that studies examining the emphasis of alternative earn-
ings metrics on stock return responses should consider 
the impact of the fourth quarter because most write-offs 
and special items are recognized in the fourth quarter 
(Bradshaw & Sloan, 2002).
In this paper, we use a sample of 308 S&P500 firms 
for the period from 2000:Q1 - 2006:Q3.1 In this partic-
ular sample, our results show that investors following 
S&P500 stocks: (i) respond more to pro forma earn-
ings than to GAAP earnings (evident from the earn-
ings response coefficients); (ii) respond to an emphasis 
on pro forma earnings in earnings press releases; and 
(iii) are fixated on pro forma earnings. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 describes the data used and methodology 
employed. Section 3 presents and explains the empiri-
cal results. Section 4 concludes.
2. Data and methodology
The final sample used in this study consists of 27 quar-
ters of data for 308 S&P500 companies. We include 
only those firms in our sample for which at least 16 
Table 1. Sample selection criteria (S&P500).
Panel A-initial sample
Number of firms
Initial sample 500
Less:
Firms dropped because fewer than 16 quarters of firm-issued earnings press 
releases are available
(192)
Panel B-final sample
Number of observations
Final sample (308 firms) 8316
Less:
Firm-issued earnings press releases not available (1816)
No strategic emphasis in earnings (EPSPro forma = EPSGAAP) (978)
Observations included in the final sample 5522
Notes:
This table shows the selection of the final sample used in this study.54 M. Shibley Sadique, M. Arifur Rahman
10.5709/ce.1897-9254.89 DOI:  CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS
Vol. 7 Issue3 51-64 2013
quarters of observations are available. Table 1 presents 
our sample selection criteria.
Daily price and volume data for the S&P500 con-
stituents are obtained from Price-Data for the sample 
period from 2000:Q1 - 2006:Q3. Quarterly GAAP 
earnings per share data are collected from the Compu-
stat North America database (Compustat item 19 for 
quarterly data). Quarterly Street earnings per share, 
median earnings forecasts, and the number of analysts 
following a firm are collected from IBES via WRDS. 
To reduce the influence of stale information, only 
the latest median forecasts around the earnings an-
nouncement days are used. Earnings release dates are 
collected from Earnings.com and are double-checked 
against official company websites (or IBES report dates 
are used if the earnings release dates are not available 
from the company websites). Firm size (market value 
of equity) data are collected from Compustat. 
We collect earnings press releases from company-
specific websites or from Factiva. Street earnings issued 
by IBES are used as a proxy for pro forma earnings to 
examine the manipulative intention of firms for two 
reasons: (i) pro forma earnings are often equal to Street 
earnings. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) document that 
IBES actual earnings equal pro forma earnings for 65 
percent of their sample; and (ii) even if pro forma and 
Street earnings are not equal, one can argue that Street 
earnings still captures managers’ intention to empha-
size. Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) claim that emphasis on 
Street earnings is originated from firm managers rather 
than from forecast data providers such as IBES.
2.1. Strategic emphasis on earnings numbers
To identify a strategic emphasis on earnings numbers, 
we follow Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) in that investors 
have limited information processing capacity, which 
results in a less complete evaluation of quarterly earn-
ings press releases. Elliott (2006); Frederickson and 
Miller (2004) use this notion as the central construct 
in their experimental study. We look for two types of 
emphasis in earnings press releases: relative emphasis 
and absolute emphasis. Considerable difference exists 
in the prominence given to pro forma versus GAAP 
earnings in company press releases. Some companies 
provide a table containing a reconciliation of pro for-
ma to GAAP earnings with details about the amounts 
excluded from pro forma earnings, which allows the 
reader to obtain a clear picture of a firm’s financial posi-
tion. Other companies provide a narrative description 
of what is excluded from pro forma earnings but do not 
list the amounts for these items. Finally, some compa-
nies mention only one earnings number without any 
immediate reconciliation information. Marques (2010) 
finds that, even after the approval of Regulation G in 
2002, not all S&P500 firms that disclose a non-GAAP 
financial measure include a reconciliation in the press 
release of the quarterly earnings announcement.2 Ac-
cordingly, when one earnings metric in a press release 
is emphasized before another, we define it as a relative 
emphasis. When only GAAP or pro forma earnings are 
mentioned without any immediate information about 
exclusions in the same paragraph of a press release, we 
define it as an absolute emphasis. In addition, if recon-
ciliation is provided in a tabular form in a press release, 
we consider it a relative emphasis. If a press release con-
tains only a narrative description of exclusions and if 
the description appears somewhere in the release but 
not immediately after where the pro forma earnings are 
mentioned, we consider it an absolute emphasis.
2.2. Strategic emphasis on earning numbers and 
stock returns
Our empirical analysis begins with a regression model 
where we regress standardized cumulative abnormal 
returns on earnings surprises, emphasis, and control 
variables such as the number of analysts following 
a firm, firm size, and a policy dummy. Firm size and 
the number of analysts following a firm provide pre-
disclosure information about a firm. Smaller (larger) 
firms are likely to have less (more) pre-disclosure in-
formation, leading to more (less) information revealed 
by earnings announcements, whereas firms that are 
followed by more (less) analysts are expected to pro-
vide large (small) amounts of firm-specific informa-
tion. To examine the effects of press emphasis on stock 
returns, we run separate regressions for each emphasis 
term. Running separate regressions for each empha-
sis term reduces the possibility of linear dependence 
between alternative earnings surprises. The regression 
model used in this study to examine the impact of 
a strategic emphasis on stock returns is given below:
, ,,
1 ,2 ,3 ,
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In the above regression model,  , it SCAR  is the stan-
dardized cumulative abnormal return around the event 
(earnings announcement) window for firm i in quarter 
t. Defining the event day as  0 d = , we calculate ab-
normal returns over the event window ( ) 1, 2 dd −+  as 
,, , ˆ ˆ id id i i md AR R R αβ = −− , where  , id R  and  , md R  are the 
realized returns for firm i and the S&P500 on day d , re-
spectively, and  ˆi α  and  ˆ
i β  are estimates from the market 
model using daily data over the period( 2, 126) dd −−
. Next, standardized abnormal returns are calculated 
as  i d i d i S   D A   R SAR / , , = , where  i S   D is the standard de-
viation of , id AR . Finally, standardized cumulative ab-
normal returns are calculated as 
2
,,
1
it id
d
SCAR SAR
+
=−
= ∑ . 
,    (    ,   )
k
it ES k pro forma GAAP =  indicates pro forma 
and GAAP earnings surprises. We define an earnings 
surprise for a firm as 
, ,4
, 10
it it
it
id
EE
ES
P
−
−
−
= , where  , it E  is 
the current quarter’s actual earnings,  ,4 it E −  is the actu-
al earnings four quarters back and  , 10 id P −  is the share 
price 10 trading days before the earnings announce-
ment or event date.  m I  represents four separate in-
dicator variables ( , forma pro k for , m            = = 3 1  and 
GAAP k for , m = =       4   2 ) that define four different 
types of emphasis. The indicator variable I1 equals 1 if 
the first item reported is pro forma earnings and 0 oth-
erwise, and I2 equals 1 if the first item reported is GAAP 
earnings and 0 otherwise. That is, I1 and I2 capture the 
relative emphasis on certain earnings metrics. To cap-
ture an absolute emphasis on earnings numbers, we use 
two more indicator variables defined as I3, which equals 
1 if a press release text emphasizes only Street earnings 
(without any immediate reconciliation information in 
the same paragraph) and 0 otherwise, and I4, which 
equals 1 if a press release text contains only GAAP earn-
ings and 0 otherwise. We have omitted firm quarters 
where Street earnings = GAAP earnings because we 
conjecture that there will be no intention on the part of 
managers to emphasize one earning metric over another 
if Street earnings are equal to GAAP earnings.
Also in Equation (1),  ,1 it SIZE −  indicates the market 
value of a firm’s equity in the last fiscal quarter,  , it ANA  
is the number of analysts following a firm, and PD is 
the policy dummy. Policy changes regarding the use of 
pro forma earnings in press releases began late in 2001 
when the SEC issued cautionary guidance on the use 
of pro forma information in earnings releases. Accord-
ingly, our policy dummy variable takes a value of 1 for 
observations after Q1:2002 and 0 otherwise. 
In the above model,  k β  represents the earnings re-
sponse coefficient (ERC) for pro forma (GAAP) earn-
ings and  m   k γ , our main coefficient of interest, captures 
the incremental response to alternative earnings met-
rics for different levels of emphasis.
2.3. Strategic emphasis on earnings numbers 
and return volatility
To identify the impact of a strategic emphasis on volatil-
ity, we regress the realized volatility of returns around 
the event window on earnings surprises, emphasis, and 
the control variables, including abnormal trading vol-
ume as an extra explanatory variable in addition to the 
number of analysts following a firm, firm size, and the 
policy dummy. Trading volume is a  well-established 
proxy for information arrival in the market (Lamoureux 
& Lastrapes, 1990; 1994). In addition, trading volume 
also reflects a lack of consensus among investors. That 
is, the volume (volatility) reaction to an earnings an-
nouncement could be high if there is more disagree-
ment among investors in interpreting the information 
content of the earnings news. Specifically, we estimate 
the following regression equation to examine the impact 
of strategic emphasis on return volatility: 
++ ++ +
,, ,
1, 12 ,3 ,4 ,
|||| *
                
kk
it ki tm ki tm
it it it i t
RV ES ES I
SIZE ANAA BVOL PD
αβ γ
δδ δδ ε −
=+ +  
   (2)
In the above regression equation,  , it RV  is the log of 
realized volatility of returns around the event (an-
nouncement) window for firm iin quarter t.3 Simi-
lar to  , it SCAR  from Equation (1) defining the event 
day as  0 d = , we calculate realized volatility over the 
event window ( ) 1, 2 dd −+ . We use the log of realized 
volatility because the distribution of realized volatil-
ity is right-skewed, while the distribution of the loga-
rithm of realized volatility is approximately Gaussian 
(Andersen et al., 2001). Abnormal trading volume (
, it ABVOL ) is calculated as the trading volume on the 
announcement day  , () id Volume  relative to the average 
trading volume over  1 d −  to  5 d − ,  ,( 1, 5) () id d Volume −− . 
That is, the abnormal trading volume is calculated as 56 M. Shibley Sadique, M. Arifur Rahman
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,
,( 1, 5)
id
id d
Volume
Volume −−
. The remaining variables in Equation 
(2),  ,
k
it ES ,  m I ,  , it ANA , and PD are defined in the pre-
vious section in relation to Equation (1). In the above 
regression model,  k β
 
is the earnings response coeffi-
cient (ERC), and  m   k γ
,
 our parameter of interest, cap-
tures the impact of emphasis on earnings numbers.
2.4. Are investors fixated on pro forma 
earnings?
To check whether the Abarbanel and Lehavy (2007) 
claim against the functional fixation hypothesis is con-
firmed by our data, we keep only those observations 
in our sample for which both the pro forma and the 
GAAP earnings exceed the benchmark (earnings for 
the same quarter in the prior year), and then again sub-
divide the sample into two groups–one group includes 
cases where the pro forma earnings exceed the GAAP 
earnings, and the other group includes cases where the 
GAAP earnings exceed the pro forma earnings. Then, 
for each of these three subsets of observations in the 
sample, we run a robust regression to estimate the fol-
lowing regression model:
it it it i t ,1 ,2 ,                    ,
PF GAAP SCAR ES ES αβ βε =+ ++  (3)
where  ,
PF
it ES  and  ,
GAAP
it ES  indicate pro forma and 
GAAP earnings surprises for firm i in quarter t, re-
spectively. We test the functional fixation hypothesis 
by comparing the ERCs of two competing earnings 
numbers. A higher significance of pro forma earnings 
in the model that directly links inflation of pro forma 
earnings to market price reaction can establish the hy-
pothesis.
3. Estimation Results
Table 2 presents summary information for the depen-
dent and independent variables used in this study. The 
mean GAAP earnings surprise is slightly higher than 
that of the pro forma surprise for firms that issued 
press releases over the sample period.
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix and the p-
values for the null hypothesis of zero correlation (in 
parentheses). The lower diagonal of each panel of the 
table reports the Pearson correlation, and the upper 
diagonal reports the Spearman rank correlations. The 
first two columns and rows show the correlations be-
tween the dependent and independent variables. For 
firm-issued press releases, a pro forma surprise is sig-
nificantly correlated with returns, but a GAAP surprise 
is only significantly correlated with returns in case of 
the Spearman rank correlation. A  stronger market 
reaction to pro forma earnings than GAAP earnings 
indicates that investors prefer to rely on pro forma 
numbers to make their investment decisions. However, 
pro forma and GAAP surprises are negatively related 
with 4-day realized volatility, with no specific pattern 
in terms of statistical significance.
We estimate the models in Equations (1) and (2) 
running pooled regressions.4 Dependence in pooled 
data may arise when (i) residuals are correlated across 
quarters for a given firm or (ii) residuals for a given 
quarter are correlated across different firms. When er-
rors are correlated, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is 
still consistent but is biased and typically suggests that 
standard errors are much too small (Cochrane, 2005). 
To ensure that the standard errors are conservative rel-
ative to alternative estimation techniques, we estimate 
the models using pooled OLS with standard errors 
clustered by calendar quarter, by firm and by White 
standard errors. We find that standard errors clustered 
by calendar quarters are on average larger than stan-
dard errors clustered by firm or by White standard er-
rors. This indicates the presence of a time effect in the 
data (Petersen, 2009). 
Table 4 reports the impact of a relative and an ab-
solute emphasis in company earnings press releases. 
Although both ERCs for pro forma and GAAP earn-
ings are positively related with contemporaneous re-
turns, only the ERC for pro forma earnings is signifi-
cant, which indicates that S&P500 investors consider 
pro forma earnings to be more value relevant. Our 
results show that relative emphasis, i.e., highlight-
ing one earnings metric over another, does not affect 
the S&P500 returns around earnings announcements 
days. However, S&P500 returns respond positively to 
absolute emphasis, i.e., they respond to earnings an-
nouncements when only pro forma earnings are men-
tioned in the text without any immediate reconcilia-
tion information in the same paragraph of the release. 
The point estimate of  m   k γ  suggests that, for the median 
value of an earnings surprise of 0.001 (Table 2), the incre-
mental effect of an emphasis on standardized cumulative 
abnormal returns around the earnings announcement Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Table 3. Correlation matrix
SCAR RV ESPF ESGAAP ANA SIZE ABVOL
Mean 0.21 -6.16 0.00 0.001 15 9.36 0.46
Median 0.26 -6.16 0.001 0.001 14 9.21 0.41
SD 3.01 1.37 0.01 0.136 6.5 1.09 0.53
P1 -7.50 -9.34 -0.06 -0.113 3 7.34 -0.68
P5 -4.15 -8.34 -0.01 -0.027 5 7.86 -0.30
P10 -2.91 -7.86 -0.005 -0.014 7 8.11 -0.15
P25 -1.49 -7.07 0.00 -0.004 10 8.56 0.10
P75 -1.83 -5.27 0.003 0.005 19 9.92 0.75
P95 4.41 -3.93 0.01 0.025 27 11.5 1.43
P99 7.87 -2.90 0.03 0.105 32 12.5 1.96
SCAR RV ESPF ESGAAP ANA SIZE ABVOL
SCAR
1.00
0.012
(0.37)
0.073
(0.00)
0.06
(0.00)
-0.025
(0.06)
-0.011
(0.42)
-0.022
(0.09)
RV
0.007
(0.58) 1.00
-0.021
(0.11)
-0.024
(0.08)
0.053
(0.00)
-0.207
(0.00)
0.173
(0.00)
ESPF 0.033
(0.01)
-0.086
(0.00) 1.00
0.00
(0.56)
0.085
(0.00)
0.058
(0.00)
0.035
(0.01)
ESGAAP 0.003
(0.84)
-0.004
(0.74)
-0.031
(0.02)
1.00
0.057
(0.00)
-0.002
(0.86)
0.012
(0.37)
ANA
-0.025
(0.07)
0.058
(0.00)
0.021
(0.12)
0.019
(0.16) 1.00
0.45
(0.00)
-0.027
(0.05)
SIZE
-0.013
(0.35)
0.191
(0.00)
0.066
(0.00)
-0.003
(0.83)
0.438
(0.00) 1.00
-0.019
(0.16)
ABVOL
-0.049
(0.00)
0.207
(0.00)
0.035
(0.01)
0.003
(0.83)
-0.033
(0.01)
-0.026
(0.05) 1.00
Notes:
SCAR is the standardized cumulative abnormal return cumulated over four days surrounding the earnings announce-
ment, RV is the log of 4-day realized volatility (around the earnings announcement), ESPF and ESGAAP are pro forma and GAAP 
earnings surprises, respectively, ANA is the number of analysts following a firm, SIZE is the log of the market value of a firm’s 
equity, and ABVOL is the log of abnormal volume (the ratio of trading volume on the day of an earnings announcement and 
the average trading volume of the previous 5 days). The sample consists of 5522 observations. 
Notes:
The Pearson (Spearman) correlation is shown below (above) the diagonal, and p -values for the null hypothesis of zero 
correlation are in parentheses. SCAR is the standardized cumulative abnormal return cumulated over four days surrounding 
the earnings announcement, RV is the log of 4-day realized volatility (around the earnings announcement), ESPF and ESGAAP 
are pro forma and GAAP earnings surprises, respectively, ANA is the number of analysts following a firm, SIZE is the log of the 
market value of a firm’s equity, and ABVOL is the log of abnormal volume (the ratio of trading volume on the day of an earn-
ings announcement and the average trading volume of the previous 5 days.) The sample consists of 5522 observations. 58 M. Shibley Sadique, M. Arifur Rahman
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date is 0.01062 (approximately 1.10%). This evidence 
supports the limited attention theory of Hirshleifer and 
Teoh (2003) and the functional fixation hypothesis of 
Hand (1990) that investors respond to an emphasis on 
pro forma earnings because they pay less attention to 
the appropriateness of the accounting procedures that 
produce accounting numbers. This result also supports 
the empirical evidence obtained by Bhattacharya et al. 
(2003), Brown and Sivakumar (2003), and in experimen-
tal studies such as those of Elliott (2006) and Frederick-
son and Miller (2004) that the market responds more to 
pro forma earnings than to GAAP earnings. However, 
the control variables included in the regression between 
press emphasis and standardized cumulative abnormal 
returns are not significant at standard significance levels.
Table 5 reports the results for the regression of 
press emphasis on realized volatility around earnings 
announcement days. Both pro forma and GAAP sur-
prises are significant and have a positive impact on 
volatility. Among the four emphasis variables, only 
the case where pro forma earnings are reported ahead 
of GAAP earnings in the press release has a signifi-
cant positive impact on volatility. The results show 
that when pro forma earnings are emphasized before 
Table 4. Impact of strategic earnings emphasis on stock returns.
Relative emphasis Absolute emphasis
(i) (ii) (i) (ii)
Constant
0.521
(0.39)
0.534
(0.39)
0.481
(0.39)
0.485
(0.40)
ESPF 8.64***
(2.21)
   --
6.14***
(2.01)
   --
ESGAAP    --
1.813
(2.49)
   --
0.349
(0.75)
ESPF*I1
-5.406
(5.91)
   --    --    --
ESGAAP*I2    --
-2.145
(2.55)
   --    --
ESPF*I3    --    --
10.62**
(4.21)
   --
ESGAAP*I4    --    --    --
-5.092
(4.15)
SIZE
-0.008
(0.04)
-0.01
(0.04)
-0.004
(0.04)
-0.005
(0.04)
ANA
-0.011
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.011
(0.01)
-0.011
(0.01)
PD
-0.102
(0.07)
-0.105
(0.07)
-0.101
(0.07)
-0.094
(0.07)
Adj. R2 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
Observations 5522 5522 5522 5522
Notes:
This table reports the results for the following regression model:
, , , 1 ,1 2 , 3 , *
kk
it k it m k it m it it it SCAR ES ES I SIZE ANA PD αβ γ δ δ δ ε − = + + + + ++ where SCAR is the 4-day standardized cu-
mulative abnormal return,  )   (   GAAP , P   F k E   Sk =  indicates pro forma and GAAP earnings surprises, respectively, 
, forma pro k for , m Im            ( = = 3 1  and  GAAP k for , m = =       4   2 ) represents indicator variables used to quantify emphasis on 
earnings numbers, SIZE is the log of the market value of a firm’s equity in the last quarter, ANA is the number of analysts 
following a firm, and PD is the policy dummy variable (to capture the impact of policy changes) that takes a value of 1 for 
observations after 2002:Q1 and 0 otherwise. Standard errors clustered by calendar quarters are in parentheses. 
** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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GAAP earnings, return volatility increases. Given the 
median value of an earnings surprise in Table 2, our 
point estimate of  m   k γ  suggests that an emphasis on 
pro forma earnings over GAAP earnings increases 
the log value of realized volatility around the earn-
ings announcement date by approximately 0.01. This 
result supports our conclusion about the return im-
pact of emphasis and bolsters our finding that inves-
tors following the S&P500 companies respond mainly 
to a pro forma earnings emphasis. Firm size (SIZE) 
shows a negative relationship with realized volatil-
ity around earnings announcement days. This result 
supports the notion that large firms have lower in-
formation asymmetry around earnings announce-
ments. The number of analysts following a firm is 
positively related with return volatility. That is, firms 
Table 5.  Impact of strategic earnings emphasis on return volatility.
Relative emphasis Absolute emphasis
(i) (ii) (i) (ii)
Constant
-3.568***
(0.03)
-3.424***
(0.31)
-3.595***
(0.30)
-3.407***
(0.31)
|ESPF|
9.09***
(1.24)
  --
10.57***
(1.47)
--
|ESGAAP|    --
1.560***
(0.40)
   --
0.595***
(0.17)
|ESPF|*I1
9.981**
(4.93)
  --    --    --
|ESGAAP|*I2    --
-0.34
(0.55)
   --    --
|ESPF|*I3    --    --
4.795
(3.52)
   --
|ESGAAP|*I4    --    -- --
0.324
(0.28)
SIZE
-0.31***
(0.04)
-0.321***
(0.04)
-0.307***
(0.04)
-0.321***
(0.04)
ANA
0.04***
(0.01)
0.04***
(0.01)
0.04***
(0.01)
0.04***
(0.01)
ABVOL
0.167***
(0.04)
0.603***
(0.05)
0.615***
(0.04)
0.604***
(0.05)
PD
-0.825***
(0.13)
-0.818***
(0.13)
-0.816***
(0.13)
-0.822***
(0.13)
Adj. R2 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17
Observations 5522 5522 5522 5522
Notes:
This table reports the results for the following regression model: 
, , , 1 ,1 2 , 3 , 4 , |||| *
kk
it k it m k it m it it it it RV ES ES I SIZE ANA ABVOL PD αβ γ δ δ δ δ ε − = + + + + + ++ where RV is the log of 4-day realized volatil-
ity,  )   (   GAAP , P   F k E   Sk =  indicates pro forma and GAAP earnings surprises, respectively,  , forma pro k for , m Im            ( = = 3 1  and 
GAAP k for , m = =       4   2 ) represents indicator variables used to quantify emphasis on earnings numbers, SIZE is the log of 
the market value of a firm’s equity in the last quarter, ANA is the number of analysts following a firm, ABVOL is the log of 
abnormal volume around the announcement day, and PD is the policy dummy variable (to capture the impact of policy 
changes) that takes a value of 1 for observations after 2002:Q1 and 0 otherwise. Standard errors clustered by calendar 
quarters are in parentheses.
** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.60 M. Shibley Sadique, M. Arifur Rahman
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with more analysts (ANA) following them are expect-
ed to produce a large amount of both financial and 
non-financial information. Therefore, the number of 
analysts following a firm is expected to reduce volatil-
ity. However, if analysts’ forecast dispersion around 
the earnings announcement day increases, volatility 
may also increase. Abnormal volume (ABVOL) has 
a significant and positive relationship with volatil-
ity, which suggests that any unexpected news (good 
or bad) is followed by above-average trading activity 
as the market seeks out a new equilibrium. However, 
the strength of this volume-volatility depends on the 
degree of homogeneity in the interpretation of the 
news. The policy dummy included in the regression 
(PD) captures the fundamental change in pro forma 
reporting incentives as well as investors’ perceptions 
about pro forma disclosures. Our results indicate that 
such changes in disclosure policy have significantly 
reduced volatility related with quarterly earnings an-
nouncements. This result may be the outcome of an 
improvement in the quality of information included 
in earnings press releases (Yi, 2012).
Our regression results reported in Table 6 show that 
investors respond to pro forma earnings when both 
the earnings exceed their benchmark and when either 
pro forma earnings are greater than GAAP earnings or 
GAAP earnings are greater than pro forma earnings. 
This result suggests that S&P500 investors are fixated 
on pro forma earnings and thus supports the theories 
regarding investors’ inattention to the use of an appro-
priate accounting procedures and their limited atten-
tion in processing earnings information (Hirshleifer 
& Teoh, 2003; Hand, 1990). However, this result does 
not support the claim of Abarbanell and Lehavy (2007) 
that the large differences between Street and GAAP 
earnings supplied by forecast data providers may lead 
Table 6. investors fixated on pro forma earnings?
When EPSPro forma and EPSGAAP are both
greater than the benchmark
Full sample
(i)
EPSPro forma>EPSGAAP
(ii)
EPSGAAP>EPSPro forma
(iii)
Constant
0.194***
(0.06)
-0.093
(0.32)
0.276***
(0.07)
ESPF 60.24***
(16.9)
109.4***
(32.9)
51.67**
(20.7)
ESGAAP -4.948
(8.41)
-24.09
(30.6)
-5.24
(9.35)
Adj. R2 0.005 0.02 0.003
Observations 2624 584 2040
Notes:
This table reports the results for the following regression model: 
it it it i t ,1 ,2 ,                    ,
PF GAAP SCAR ES ES αβ βε =+ ++
where SCAR is the 4-day standardized cumulative abnormal return, and ESPF and ESGAAP indicate pro forma and GAAP earnings 
surprises, respectively. Column (i) reports the results for the full sample when both pro forma and GAAP earnings exceed the 
benchmark (earnings for the same quarter in the prior year), Column (ii) reports the results for the sample when both pro 
forma and GAAP earnings exceed the benchmark and pro forma is higher than GAAP earnings, and Column (iii) reports the 
results for the sample when both pro forma and GAAP earnings exceed the benchmark and GAAP is higher than pro forma 
earnings. 
** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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a researcher to wrongly support the notion that inves-
tors are fixated on Street earnings.
3.1. Robustness Checks
3.1.1. Impact of extreme observations
To check whether our results are robust to extreme 
observations, we re-estimate the regression models in 
Equation (1) and Equation (2) using robust regression. 
Our results (not tabulated) for emphasis on compet-
ing earnings numbers by companies remain similar to 
our pooled OLS results. That is, we find that investors 
respond to an absolute pro forma earnings emphasis in 
the case of returns regression and respond to a relative 
emphasis on pro forma earnings in the case of volatil-
ity regression.
3.1.2. Impact of the fourth quarter
Fourth quarter earnings differ systematically from 
other quarter’s earnings (Mendenhall & Nichols, 1988; 
Bradshaw & Sloan, 2002). Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) 
find that growth calculations based on Street earnings 
per share are statistically larger than those based on 
GAAP earnings per share. This difference is especially 
pronounced in the fourth quarter, where mean growth 
based on Street earnings per share is approximately 
three times that calculated based on GAAP earnings 
per share. Managerial opportunism and accounting 
year-end adjustments are considered the main reasons 
for such a difference. From the viewpoint of a strate-
gic emphasis in earnings numbers, the fourth quarter 
is unique because discretionary write offs and special 
items are recognized more in the fourth quarter than 
in other quarters. To account for the unique nature of 
the fourth quarter and to examine whether it affects 
our empirical results, we rerun regression models in 
Equation (1) and Equation (2) excluding the fourth 
quarter observations from the sample. 
Our results (not tabulated) show that when re-run-
ning the regressions without fourth quarter observa-
tions, the significant return response to an absolute 
emphasis on pro forma earnings vanishes, whereas the 
relationship between volatility and pro forma earnings 
emphasis becomes weak in terms of statistical signifi-
cance. However, the return and volatility response to 
pro forma and GAAP surprises remains significant. 
This result supports the claim of Bradshaw and Sloan 
(2002) that the fourth quarter plays a role in results 
that provide statistical support for a greater investor 
reaction to pro forma earnings.
4. Summary and Conclusion
When preparing pro forma earnings statements, 
managers generally exclude nonrecurring transitory 
items that are believed to be less relevant to normal 
ongoing company operations. Because pro forma 
statements are neither audited nor subject to direct 
scrutiny by the SEC, companies effectively enjoy the 
discretion to exclude anything from these financial 
statements that they believe can affect the accuracy 
of their financial outlook. Although proponents of 
pro forma estimates argue that these numbers pro-
vide a better idea about a company’s actual earnings 
performance, they leave open the possibility of op-
portunistically omitting certain important expense 
items to overstate a company’s financial performance. 
One of the most controversial uses of pro forma 
statements is to release pro forma numbers to market 
participants before the audited GAAP financial state-
ments are made available. Early releases of pro forma 
numbers without a  clear-cut reconciliation of pro 
forma to GAAP numbers can encourage investors to 
make investment decisions on the basis of incomplete 
information.
Using a sample of 308 firms from the S&P500 for 
the period from 2000:Q1 - 2006:Q3, we find that the 
investors do respond to an emphasis on pro forma 
earnings in earnings press releases, and they are not 
as attentive to judging whether exclusions from pro 
forma statements are appropriate when making in-
vestment decisions. Our results also show that when 
pro forma earnings are emphasized before GAAP 
earnings, stock return volatility increases in the pe-
riod surrounding the earnings disclosure in the press 
releases. These results are robust to extreme observa-
tions in the sample.
We also provide empirical evidence that nullifies the 
claim of Abarbanell & Lehavy (2007) that the reported 
incremental investor response to Street earnings is in 
fact driven by the high frequency of large differences 
between Street and GAAP numbers. Using robust re-
gression estimation, we show that the functional fixa-
tion hypothesis propounded by Hand (1990) still holds 
even if we recognize the claim made by Abarbanell & 
Lehay (2007).62 M. Shibley Sadique, M. Arifur Rahman
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When fourth quarter observations are dropped 
from our estimation, return response to an absolute 
emphasis on pro forma earnings becomes insignifi-
cant, and the relationship between volatility and a pro 
forma earnings emphasis becomes weak in terms of 
statistical significance. However, the return and vola-
tility response to pro forma and GAAP surprises re-
mains significant. 
The results of this paper may have implications for 
market regulators and policy makers in that they may 
help to formulate rules to increase the quality and 
quantity of information by defining what and how 
information should be presented to investors. If small 
investors respond to managers’ strategic behavior in 
terms of an emphasis on earnings numbers, policy 
makers should take action by changing the present 
policy or by introducing a new policy to control the 
adverse effect of a strategic emphasis by firms. How-
ever, such policy measures may not work in the case of 
judgmental errors made by rational investors. There-
fore, in addition to devising an appropriate policy 
response, investors also need to be educated (for ex-
ample, through information campaigns) so that they 
can identify such strategic behavior of companies and 
make more rational investment decisions.
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Endnotes
1  The sample period of 2000 to 2006 is chosen to in-
crease the number of firms included in the study. 
Considering the scarcity of firm-specific data from 
the source we use, we could not go back beyond 
2000. In addition, we have not extended the study 
period beyond 2006 because with the introduction 
of Regulation G in early 2003, the number of firms 
using a strategic emphasis has decreased, although 
it has not stopped entirely (Marques, 2010).
2  The SEC has adopted Regulation G (Reg G) effective 
from March 2003 that is applicable to public com-
panies’ disclosures of certain ﬁnancial information 
that is presented on the basis of methodologies other 
than GAAP. This regulation requires a reconcilia-
tion of non-GAAP to GAAP measures in all public 
announcements made by a firm.
3   Assuming that returns are zero mean and have zero 
autocorrelation, realized volatility of returns is esti-
mated as the sum of daily squared returns over the 
event window ( 1, 2 dd −+ ).
4  A primary reason that we use pooled regression 
analysis is to capture not only the variation that 
emerges through time or space but also to capture 
the variation of these two dimensions simultane-
ously. Moreover, because cross-sectional variation 
is usually greater than time-series variation, the 
pooled estimates are expected to have the desir-
able property of being derived from a wider space 
of variation than estimates based solely on time-
series data.
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